We study a model of strategic disclosure where a decision maker consults an expert of uncertain types about the state … unique equilibrium involves an interim interval where the strategic expert mixes between disclosure and concealment, along … with regions of complete concealment and disclosure. A higher weight attached to reputational concern by the strategic …

costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same … naive or delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of … the information structure under which this effect manifests and show that whenever it does, full disclosure is socially …

costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative and, at the same … or delegating receivers. Disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of … the information structure under which this effect manifests and show that whenever it does, full disclosure is socially …