We prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems with multi-unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts

We present the renegotiable acceptance mechanism in the context of the multi-unit assignment problem. This mechanism combines features of the immediate and deferred acceptance mechanisms and implements the set of stable matchings in both Nash and undominated Nash equilibria under substitutable...

We present the conditional acceptance mechanism for the course allocation problem. This mechanism combines features of the immediate acceptance and the student optimal stable mechanisms. It implements the set of stable allocations in both Nash and undominated Nash equilibria under substitutable...

We assess students' ability to forecast future earnings, by using data on expected wages self-reported by college students with different graduation horizons. We find a significant gender gap, by which wages expectations are systematically lower for women than for men. However, the gender gap in...