We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all...

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and...

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central...

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of their efforts. We assume that student preferences are...

Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic...

We develop a method to measure the fairness of school matching mechanisms and apply it to the Boston mechanism used in the Chinese college admissions system. Fairness is measured by mismatch, or the gap between the actual and fair matching outcomes. An individual's mismatch is then related to...

I propose a centralized clearinghouse for college admissions in which students can signal enthusiasm by commitment, as in early-decision programs. Furthermore, students can specify financial aid in their preferences and they can be matched with multiple colleges simultaneously. This...

Recently, many matching systems around the world have been reformed. These reforms responded to objections that the matching mechanisms in use were unfair and manipulable. Surprisingly, the mechanisms remained unfair even after there forms: the new mechanisms may induce an out come with a...

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central...

Die von Gale und Shapley in ihrem 1962 veröffentlichten Artikel "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage" vorgestellte "deferred acceptance procedure" hat in der Literatur zu einer umfassenden Diskussion über Zuordnungsverfahren auf zweiseitigen Märkten geführt, die sich mit der...