The paper analyzes strategic behavior in a two-stage environmental choice problem under different information scenarios. Given uncertainty about environmental cost and irreversibility of development, "learning without destroying" emerges from strategic competition when information is endogenous...

We study a non-cooperative model of unilateral network formation. Derks et al. [2008b] prove the existence of local-Nash and global-Nash networks for games with payoff functions that satisfy a framework of axiomatic properties. These properties are inspired by the one-way flow model, which is...

In a strategic coalitional game, we consider the relations among four cores α, β, γ, and the one we call δ which is obtained by slightly weakening the conjectural cooperative equilibria due to Currarini and Marini. We show that the α-core and the γ-core are refined by the δ-core; and,...

The objective of this work is to analyze how social networks coevolve with other dimensions of agents' choice. We present a model where agents choose their neighbors as well as a mode of behavior in 2 × 2 anti-coordination games, i.e. games where an individual's best response is to behave...

In this paper we consider a special class of n-person potential games and investigate partial cooperation between a portion of the players that sign a cooperative agreement. Existence results of partial cooperative equilibria are obtained and some possible applications are discussed,...

This contribution addresses the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. [1992, Theory and Decision 32] on the use of game theory in river basin management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic solutions impose a computational burden. For the...

Focusing on signaling games, I illustrate the relevance of the rationalizability approach for the analysis multistage games with incomplete information. I define a class of iterative solution procedures, featuring a notion of "forward induction": the Receiver tries to explain the Sender's...

This paper considers contests in which the efforts of the players determine the value of the prize. Players may have different valuations of the prize and different abilities to convert expenditures to productive efforts. In addition, players may face different financial constraints. This paper...

We conceive of a player in dynamic games as a set of agents, which are assigned the distinct tasks of reasoning and node-specific choices. The notion of agent connectedness measuring the sequential stability of a player over time is then modeled in an extended type-based epistemic framework....

This paper combines the imperfect reliability model of Bala and Goyal [2000b] with the heterogeneous player model of Galeotti et al. [2006]. We compare existence, characterization and efficiency results in the resulting framework with the results in other frameworks allowing for imperfect...