The matter of a top manager's motivation is adapted to the consumer behavior theory. It has been demonstrated that the problem of bringing a non-financial motivation to a financial one may be solved with a certain error. This problem may be overcome by introducing a special metric of utility...

Overstaffng appears to be a source of signi cant ineffciencies in organizations, but there is little economic theory that informs us why. We extend the canonical Lazear-Rosen tournament model to a dynamic setting that yields overstaffng at the managerial level. Overstaffng can be optimal in...

I consider the optimal contract for an overconfident manager in a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the contract is written on the earnings of the firm. Overconfidence causes the manager to overestimate his ability to affect the outcome of the firm. Overconfidence first reduces cost...

This paper addresses the key determinants of merger failure, in particular the role of innovation (post-merger performance) and technology (ex-ante selection) when firms decide to separate. After a brief review of the existing literature we introduce a model of process innovation where merged...