We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents' preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a...

We study one-sided matching problem, also known as roommate problem, where a group of people need to be paired in order to be assigned to certain location. We assume that number of rooms are limited and thus no student can live by himself. Each student has strict preferences over their...

Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the stability theorem fails for the roommate problem. In this...

We investigate the implications of imposing balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction in the context of sequencing problems. Balanced consistency requires that the effect on the payoff from the departure of one agent to another agent should be equal between any two agents. On the other...

We investigate the implications of imposing balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction in the context of sequencing problems. Balanced consistency requires that the effect on the payoff from the departure of one agent to another agent should be equal between any two agents. On the other...

We analyze a discrete-time search problem in which committee members inspect alternatives sequentially over a finite search horizon. A collective decision to stop searching and accept the current alternative is reached when it is supported by a threshold number of individual votes. We...

We investigate the implications of imposing balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction in the context of sequencing problems. Balanced consistency requires that the effect on the payoff from the departure of one agent to another agent should be equal between any two agents. On the other...

This paper studies a decentralised job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other...

It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for pairwise stability when group deviations are allowed. Group...

We embed a two-sided matching market with non-transferable utility, a marriage market, into a random search model. We study steadystate equilibria and characterize the limit of the corresponding equilibrium matchings as exogenous search frictions become small. The central question is whether the...