We conduct one of the first laboratory experiments and noncooperative analyses of the de-centralized matching market … but some differ from experimental evidence. Stable matching, which coincides with efficient matching in this setting, is … core and whether efficient matching is assortative determine the rate of matching, efficient matching, and surplus achieved …

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premune-ation values—the values to the …

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of …, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching …

We introduce the notion of expectational equilibrium in a very general specification of the many-to-one matching with …

We define the median stable matching for two sided matching markets with side payments and prove constructively that it …

empty, it contains a unique matching, the dominance invariant stable matching, in which all agents who mutually top rank …

characterize the existence of stable assignments in many-to-one matching problems with externalities. The set of stable matchings … bottom q-substitutability that guarantees the existence of at least one stable matching when the set of estimations includes …

It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the … (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …