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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435753
We show that supply functions cannot be classified as either strategic complements or substitutes according to the twofold criterion advanced by Bulow et al. (1985). This is because while the slope of the best reply is univocally positive, this is not the case with the sign of the cross...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021217
This paper aims at participating in the long-lasting debate about the analytical foundations of the Cournot equilibrium. In a homogeneous oligopoly, under standard regularity conditions, we prove that Cournot-Nash emerges both under (i) price competition and Cournot conjectures; and (ii) supply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024253
We show that the standard argument according to which supply function equilibria rank intermediate between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria may be reversed. We prove this result within a static oligopolistic game in which both supply function competition and Cournot competition yield a unique...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024671
We investigate an extended game with observable delay under duopolistic competition in affine supply functions. Firms use the intercepts of supply functions as their strategic variables. Best replies are downward (upward) sloping if the common slope of supply functions is sufficiently low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989619
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699792
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011942952
We investigate an extended game with observable delay under duopolistic competition in affine supply functions. Firms use the intercepts of supply functions as their strategic variables. Best replies are downward (upward) sloping if the common slope of supply functions is sufficiently low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705463
In this note we revisit the result by Menezes and Quiggin (2012), showing that under linear supply function competition, the same Nash equilibrium results when arms choose slopes or intercepts of their supply functions. This is because the first order conditions emerging in the two strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011714330
We show that supply functions cannot be classified as either strategic complements or substitutes according to the twofold criterion advanced by Bulow et al. (1985). This is because while the slope of the best reply is univocally positive, this is not the case with the sign of the cross...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011714371