We study how network structure affects the dynamics of collateral in presence of rehypothecation. We build a simple model wherein banks interact via chains of repo contracts and use their proprietary collateral or re-use the collateral obtained by other banks via reverse repos. In this...

Excessive leverage, i.e. the abuse of debt financing, is considered one of the primary factors in the default of financial institutions. Systemic risk results from correlations between individual default probabilities that cannot be considered independent. Based on the structural framework by...

Excessive leverage, i.e. the abuse of debt financing, is considered one of the primary factors in the default of financial institutions. Systemic risk results from correlations between individual default probabilities that cannot be considered independent. Based on the structural framework by...

We model the systemic risk associated with the so-called balance-sheet amplification mechanism in a system of banks with interlocked balance sheets and with positions in real-economy-related assets. Our modeling framework integrates a stochastic price dynamics with an active balance-sheet...

Financial networks have shown to be important in understanding systemic events in credit markets. In this paper, we investigate how the structure of those networks can affect the capacity of regulators to assess the level of systemic risk. We introduce a model to compute the individual and...

We study financial networks and reveal a new kind of systemic risk arising from what we call default ambiguity, i.e., a situation where it is impossible to decide which banks are in default. Specifically, we study the clearing problem: given a network of banks interconnected by financial...