This paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination, when information is private or nonverifiable. WE focus on a two-jurisdiction model where capital can move across borders, and where jurisdictions have different public goods requirements, but are otherwise...

The literature on the regulation of multinationals' transfer prices has not considered the possibility that governments choose their transfer pricing rules in a non-cooperative fashion. The present paper fills this gap and shows that a non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized by...

This paper proposes a general framework for analyzing commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles, based on three possible tax spillovers, the consumer price spillover, the producer price/terms of trade spillover, and rent spillovers. A model is presented which can be...

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive revelation principle for contracting games in which several principals compete for one privately informed agent. In particular, we show that given any profile of incentive...

This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a locational model of public goods provision, where jurisdictions are represented by coalitions of consumers with similar tastes, and where the levels of taxation and local public goods provision within...

It has realized since Pigou (1947) that if public goods are financed by distortionary taxation, the marginal social cost of providing the public good will exceed the actual resource cost by the marginal deadweight cost of taxation.

This paper outlines the issues relevant to the operation of lottery games. We consider how such games should be designed, what a portfolio of games might look like, how the operator should be regulated, how spending on lottery games should be taxed, and what considerations are relevant to the...

The cost incurred by the sender of an e-mail does not reflect the costs to the recipient, leading to a larger number of messages being sent than is optimal for the general welfare. As a solution, we suggest a per-message e-mail tax on the sender similar to that proposed by Shiman (1996), with...

Many public goods generate utility only when combined with time-input. Important examples include road networks and publicly provided leisure facilities. If it is possible to charge for the time spent using the public good it is generally a second-best Pareto optimal policy to do so even in the...