We examine how political, institutional, and economic variables affect the likelihood increases in state gasoline taxes.

Some regulatory programs are effective only if firms make some irreversible investments which reduce the cost of compliance. A firm potentially subject to regulation may therefore behave strategically - not investing and thus forcing the regulator to void the proposed regulation. We show that...

This paper analyzes the idea that political opposition to a tax increases with two factors: 1) the amount of tax that would be owed if consumers did not reduce their consumption of the taxed good, and 2) the consumer surplus consumers would enjoy in the absence of the tax.

Warlords complete for turf that provides them with rents and "taxable" resources while also providing a semblance of security within their respective territories. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition can lead to lower...

We propose that people value not only the goods they consume, but also their freedom, which increases with the number of bundles their budget allows them to buy. We apply this idea to show that citizens may favor proportional taxes over lump-sum taxes, progressive taxes over proportional taxes,...