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If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of...
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A solution on a class of TU games that satisfies the axioms of the pre-nucleolus or -kernel except the equal treatment property and is single valued for two-person games, is a nonsymmetric pre-nucleolus (NSPN) or -kernel (NSPK). We investigate the NSPKs and NSPNs and their relations to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993392
It is well-known that the prekernel on the class of TU games is uniquely determined by non-emptiness, Pareto efficiency (EFF), covariance under strategic equivalence (COV), the equal treatment property, the reduced game property (RGP), and its converse. We show that the prekernel on the class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847974
It is well-known that the prekernel on the class of TU games is uniquely determined by non-emptiness, Pareto efficiency (EFF), covariance under strategic equivalence (COV), the equal treatment property, the reduced game property (RGP), and its converse. We show that the prekernel on the class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999975
We prove that the core on the set of all transferable utility games with players contained in a universe of at least five members can be axiomatized by the zero inessential game property, covariance under strategic equivalence, anonymity, boundedness, the weak reduced game property, the converse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375608
t is well-known that the prenucleolus on the class of TU games is characterized by singlevaluedness, covariance under strategic equivalence, anonymity, and the reduced game property. We show that the prenucleolus on the class of TU games restricted to the connected coalitions with respect to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421711
An element of the possibly unbounded core of a cooperative game with precedence constraints belongs to its bounded core if any transfer to a player from any of her subordinates results in payoffs outside the core. The bounded core is the union of all bounded faces of the core, it is nonempty if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493567