We provide novel evidence of an economically significant “seller's put” implied in M&A deals. Sellers maintain extensive legal rights to walk away from an initial deal – presumably when their value increases – while bidders are more constrained in their ability to withdraw. We model M&A...

Firm value can change substantially between the time deal terms for a public target are set and closing, risking renegotiation or termination. We find increases in market volatility decrease subsequent deal activity, but only for public targets subject to an interim period. The effect is...

We examine whether Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), an external governance mechanism, stimulate cross-border mergers by protecting the property rights of foreign acquirers. Exploiting the staggered adoption and bilateral nature of the treaties, we find that BITs have a large positive effect...

Using staggered changes in state corporate income tax rates, we document that firms are more likely to undertake an acquisition and pay cash for it when taxes increase. The likelihood is greater for financially constrained firms. We find no change in the CAR and takeover premia after tax...