Mergers in the pharmaceutical sector warrant special scrutiny not only because of concerns over affordability of medicines, but also because the institutional details of pharmaceutical markets complicate the economic analysis of merger effects. Standard anti-trust analysis of mergers, in...

Pharmaceutical markets are complex. Multiple agents, including doctors, insurers, and pharmacies, play critical roles that affect competition between manufacturers and patient choice between drugs. This complexity, however, is neglected in standard antitrust analysis. In evaluating proposed...

Should internet era merger policy differ from industrial era merger policy? Platform ecosystems rely on economies of scale, data-driven economies of scope, high-quality algorithmic systems, and strong network effects that frequently promote winner-take-most markets. Their market dominance has...

The interface and coordination of securities regulation of tender offers, merger review proceedings set up by competition law and any other bodies of sectoral regulation potentially applicable to a given transaction is a key issue in governing modern markets. Indeed, Securities Regulation,...

Merger control exists to help safeguard effective competition. However, findings from a natural experiment suggest that regulatory merger control reduces the profitability of corporate acquisitions. Uncertainty about merger control decisions reduces takeover threats from foreign and very large...

This study examines how the appointment of former politicians and regulators to boards of directors or management teams influences corporate acquisition activity and performance. We find that bidders with political connections are more likely to acquire targets and avoid regulatory delay or...

An important component of corporate governance is the regulation of significant transactions – mergers, acquisitions, and restructuring. This paper (a chapter in Oxford Handbook on Corporate Law and Governance, forthcoming) reviews how M&A and restructuring are regulated by corporate and...

We examine whether and how firms structure their merger and acquisition (M&A) deals to avoid scrutiny from antitrust regulators. There are approximately 40% more M&As than expected bunching just below thresholds that trigger antitrust review. These “stealth acquisitions” tend to involve...

We examine how acquirers’ political connections affect the bargaining outcomes in deal negotiations that involve significant regulatory uncertainties. In the context of takeover antitrust reviews, we show that politically connected acquirers pay a lower takeover premium to and share a smaller...

The ultimate goal of antitrust enforcement is to maximize the surplus consumers enjoy by enhancing production efficiency and eliminating market power. Previous literature focuses on the average net wealth effects on merging firms and their stakeholder firms and reports evidence of efficiency...