Kathryn Judge of Columbia University documents how financial intermediaries persistently impose high fees compared to the value rendered, attributes this to political influence, and suggests countervailing policy strategies, including stoking competition and enhancing disclosure to reduce...

We construct a dynamic takeover law index using hand-collected data on legal provisions and empirically examine the effect of takeover regulation to protect shareholders on shareholder wealth for bidders and targets in a multi-country setting. We find that a stricter takeover law increases the...

Double moral hazard problems are prevalent in merger remedies. We consider a holdup problem in which two merging parties forced to sell an asset to a potential buyer, both engage in relationship-specific investments sequentially in order to prepare for an asset transfer. We show that an option...

This paper provides an exhaustive literature review of the motives for public-to-private LBO transactions. First, the paper develops the theoretical framework for the potential sources of value creation from going private: a distinction is made between the reduction in agency costs, stakeholder...

Takeover defenses have long been a topic of considerable interest to scholars of finance and corporate law. Yet the significant amount of attention that researchers have lavished on the topic have produced surprisingly little scholarly consensus. This chapter considers a number of major topics...

We examine whether, how, and why acquirer shareholder voting matters. We show that acquirers with low institutional ownership, high deal risk, and high agency costs are more likely to bypass shareholder voting. Such acquirers have lower announcement returns and make higher offers than those who...

I investigate whether implementation of the mandatory bid rule – the rule that grants all shareholders the right to participate in a takeover transaction at equal terms – affects target announcement returns. I use a difference-in-differences approach and the staggered adoption of the rule...

We study the impact of institutional investors' “voice” on 201 going private tender offers by controlling shareholders ("freeze-out" offers) in Israel. Israeli regulatory intervention in freeze-out tender offers is relatively mild, thus institutional investors' activism becomes crucial. We...

Voting rights are a basic shareholder-protection mechanism. Outside of the core voting requirements state law imposes (election of directors and votes on fundamental changes), federal law grants shareholders additional voting rights. But these rights introduce concomitant costs into corporate...