We investigate the suggested substitutive relation between executive compensation and the disciplinary threat of takeover imposed by the market for corporate control. We complement other empirical studies on managerial compensation and corporate control mechanisms in three distinct ways. First,...

China's short stock market history has already seen three merger waves, yet little is known of the performance drivers of acquirers. Using an acquirer's announced target value as the proxy of the firm's acquiring capacity, the link between that and its operational and/or financial conditions was...

We compare two mechanisms through which a potential entrant can take over an incumbent in a market with asymmetric firms: auctions (where other incumbents can bid for the target) and bilateral negotiations between the entrant and the target. The entrant’s choice of target depends on the...

Using the parametric and non-parametric tests, this study aims to understand the wealth effects of shareholders of bidder, target and combined firms on the announcement of takeovers. The sample for the study consists of targets from financial sector which are listed in Bombay Stock Exchange...

This study aims to develop a real business life case on the two-step leveraged buyout transaction. Also, it is to share the case with the audience that might be globally related since the financial system has been global. And, consequently the language of financial reporting has been becoming...

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The equal opportunity rule is seen as protecting investors in the event of a transfer of control. In order to better analyze the consequence of such a rule, we need to account for the information asymmetry that exists between new controlling shareholders and outside investors with private...

Having been introduced in the European Union and in many other countries, the equal opportunity rule is seen as protecting investors in the event of a transfer of control. This rule should be analyzed in a context of appropriation of private benefits between the new controlling shareholders and...

We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful managers. This allows firms to reduce performance-based compensation and can rationalize loss-making acquisitions. At the same time, takeovers remain a substitute for board dismissal...