We examine the conflict of interest that an investment bank faces when advising both the target and acquirer in a merger or acquisition (M&A) by investigating how common advisors affect deal outcomes. We compare M&As with common advisors to deals in which targets and acquirers use different...

This paper examines the determinants of merging firms' choice of a common or separate M&A advisor, and the consequences of this choice on several deal outcomes. We analyze a large sample of acquisitions and account for the endogenous choice of common or separate advisors. We find that common...

This paper examines the determinants of merging firms' choice of a common or separate M&A advisor, and the consequences of this choice on several deal outcomes. We analyze a large sample of acquisitions and account for the endogenous choice of common or separate advisors. We find that common...

We examine the effects of busy directors on merger premiums and conclude that busy directors are not uniformly detrimental. We provide evidence that busy CEOs of acquirer firms are associated with lower premiums suggesting they do not shirk their responsibilities. Busy CEOs of target firms...