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Information Content of Directors’ Trading Around Acquisition
Shams, Syed - 2016
This paper investigates the patterns of directors' trades and returns around takeover announcements. We find that the pre-announcement net value (the difference between buy value and sell value) of directors' trading is positively related to acquirers' announcement period abnormal returns. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013005344
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Do Strong Boards and Trading in Their Own Firm's Stock Help CEOs Make Better Decisions? Evidence from Corporate Acquisitions by Overconfident CEOs
Kolasinski, Adam C. - 2017
Little evidence exists on whether boards help managers make better decisions. We provide evidence that strong and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012976636
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Overpayments in Acquisitions, Preannouncement Insider Trading, and Executive Compensation
Akbulut, Mehmet - 2015
Casual observations suggest that bidder managers sometimes pay more than the economic value of target in mergers and … that bidder managers exploit their information advantage about the pricing implications of overpaid acquisitions by … acquisitions. Second, we document that bidder managers pay more than the economic value of targets not due to managerial hubris or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013034272
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Managerial Talk of Trust and Takeover Performance
Ghufran, Bushra - 2021
to managers purposefully lulling investors to keep them from paying attention and identifying managerial misconduct …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013243561
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Informed Trading Around Merger and Acquisition Announcements : Evidence from the UK Equity and Options Market
Siougle, Georgia - 2011
This paper offers new evidence on informed trading around merger and acquisition announcements from the UK equity and options market. The analysis suggests that in about 25%-33% of events there is abnormal option trading volume during the month that precedes the announcement. Such evidence is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013133655
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Insider Trading in Takeover Targets
Agrawal, Anup - 2011
We examine insider trading in about 3,700 targets of takeovers announced during 1988-2006 and in a control sample of non-targets, both during an ‘informed' and a control period. Using difference-in-differences regressions of several insider trading measures, we find no evidence that insiders...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134111
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Institutional Trades around Takeover Announcements : Skill Vs. Inside Information
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan - 2011
This paper examines the pattern and profitability of institutional trades around takeover announcements. We find that the trades of funds as a group, either before or after takeover announcements, are not profitable. However, funds whose main broker is also a target advisor are net buyers of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134118
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Informed Institutional Trading around Merger and Acquisition Announcements
Daouk, Hazem - 2012
Merger and Acquisition (M&A) activities are not well-anticipated corporate events in the equity market. Do institutional investors possess material non-public information before M&A announcements? Using a novel methodology that infers high frequency institutional trading, this paper investigates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116852
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Takeover Bids and Insider Trading
Schouten, Michael C. - 2013
This paper analyzes the law and economics of insider trading in the context of takeover bids, focusing on the European regulatory framework. We distinguish between trading by the bidder, by the target and by classical insiders and first address the issue of precisely when information about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013090185
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Target Insiders’ Preferences When Trading Before Takeover Announcements : Deal Completion Probability, Premium and Deal Characteristics
Fidrmuc, Jana P. - 2020
We contribute to the M&A literature by characterizing the information available to insiders of selling firms during the pre-public takeover negotiations by analyzing insider trading during this period. We show that target insiders increase their net purchases only once bidders start signing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851275