In each of the three largest economies with dispersed ownership of public companies - the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan - hostile takeovers emerged under a common set of circumstances. Yet the national regulatory responses to these new market developments diverged substantially....

Core institutions of UK corporate governance, in particular those relating to takeovers, board structure and directors' duties, are strongly orientated towards a norm of shareholder primacy. Beyond the core, in particular at the intersection of insolvency and employment law, stakeholder...

The manner in which hostile takeovers have historically been executed has just begun to receive serious academic attention. Similarly, while the literature on the accuracy and determinants of share prices is voluminous, there has been little systematic historical analysis of when and how modern...

This paper, which was prepared for a University of Illinois College of Law symposium honoring Prof. Larry Ribstein, examines the origins of the market for corporate control in the United States. The standard historical narrative is that the market for corporate control took on its modern form in...

Hostile takeovers are commonly thought to play a key role in rendering managers accountable to dispersed shareholders. Yet, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the very significant differences in takeover regulation between the two most prominent practitioners of hostile takeover, the...