We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents...

We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents...

We examine the incentives for a government to levy an optimal tariff on a foreign monopolist. With complete information, the home government uses tariffs to extract rents and therefore implements a policy of discriminatory tariffs entailing higher tariffs on more efficient firms. By contrast if...

We examine the incentives for a government to levy an optimal tariff on a foreign monopolist with unknown costs. With complete information, the home government uses tariffs to extract rents and implements a discriminatory policy that imposes higher tariffs on the more efficient monopolist. If...

We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents...

We examine the incentives for a government to levy an optimal tariff on a foreign monopolist. With complete information, the home government uses tariffs to extract rents and therefore implements a policy of discriminatory tariffs entailing higher tariffs on more efficient firms. By contrast if...