We study the role of labour and credit market imperfections for the determination of equilibrium unemployment. In the credit market loan contracts are negotiated between financiers and firms, both possessing bargaining power, while the firms and organized labour bargain over the base wage. The...

We study both the various consequences and the incentives of outsourcing. We argue that the wage elasticity of labour demand is increasing as a function of the share of outsourcing, which is importantly a result consistent with existing empirical research. Furthermore, we show that a production...

We study the various consequences of and the incentives for outsourcing. We argue that the wage elasticity of labour demand increases as a function of the share of outsourcing, which is a result consistent with existing empirical research. Furthermore, we show that a production mode with a...

We study the role of labour and credit market imperfections in the determination of equilibrium unemployment. In the credit market, loan contracts are negotiated between financiers and firms, both of which have bargaining power, while firms and organized labour bargain over the base wage. The...

We analyze the impact of entrepreneurship as an outside option on compensation contracts between a principal and an agent with bargaining power. In the first stage the parties bargain over the base wage and the profit share. In the second stage the principal determines the capital investment and...

We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high-skilled and low-skilled...