Understanding the effects of reciprocity on tax morale is crucial to explain tax compliance behavior. However, there is only little research about which sources of reciprocity affect tax morale most. Thus, this paper for the first time gauges the effects from two sources of reciprocity on tax...

In this paper, we develop a model that can explain why governments may want to choose to offer a voluntary disclosure program that allows people who withheld taxes to turn themselves in without punishment. We find that such a leniency rule not only increases government revenue when it comes as a...

The compliance costs of private taxpayers are not only affected by the tax law itself but also by its implementation through the tax authorities. In this paper we analyze the effect of the tax authorities on the burden of complying with tax regulations. Using survey data of Belgian businesses...

We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the effectiveness of tax subsidies implemented by the German government as a measure to combat evasion of taxes on services purchased by private households. Based on a theoretical analysis of the choice between formal and informal provision of...

Governments increasingly use nudges to improve tax collection. We synthesize the growing literature that evaluates nudging experiments using meta-analytical methods. We find that simple reminders increase the probability of compliance by 2.7 percentage points relative to the baseline where about...

We study the impact of media bias on tax compliance. Through a framed laboratory experiment, we assess how the exposure to biased news about government action affects compliance in a repeated taxation game. Subjects treated with positive news are significantly more compliant than the control...

We experimentally analyze three anti-tax-evasion mechanisms: (1) prefilling of deductions in tax returns, (2) restricting tax evasion opportunities by either disallowing or (3) limiting the deductibility of expenditures. We find that prefilling compared to blank forms reduces tax evasion....

This paper explores withholding-tax non-compliance in the context of dividend taxation. It focuses on a specific type of stock-market transactions around ex-dividend dates, so-called “cum-ex” trades, which caused considerable revenue losses due to illegitimate tax refunds in Germany and...