This paper shows that accounting for variation in mistakes can be crucial for welfare analysis. Focusing on consumer underreaction to not-fully-salient sales taxes, we show theoretically that the efficiency costs of taxation are amplified by differences in underreaction across individuals and...

This paper develops and implements a series of tests of costly attention models, in the context of consumer misreaction to opaque prices. We derive a series of predictions about how the sign and magnitude of misreaction varies with stakes. We then test and confirm these predictions in an...

This paper shows that accounting for variation in mistakes can be crucial for welfare analysis. Focusing on consumer underreaction to not-fully-salient sales taxes, we show theoretically that the efficiency costs of taxation are amplified by differences in underreaction across individuals and...

This paper develops and implements a series of tests of costly attention models, in the context of consumer misreaction to opaque prices. We derive a series of predictions about how the sign and magnitude of misreaction varies with stakes. We then test and confirm these predictions in an...