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Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms

Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - In: Journal of human capital : JHC 2 (2008) 4, pp. 410-440

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003835014

Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms

Kvaløy, Ola (contributor); Olsen, Trond E. (contributor) - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003586246

The rise of individual performance pay

Kvaloy, Ola (contributor); Olsen, Trond E. (contributor) - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003624013

The rise of individual performance pay

Kvaløy, Ola (contributor); Olsen, Trond E. (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003394949

Teams and tournaments in relational contracts

Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227446

Teams in relational contracts

Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011575740

Relational contracts, multiple agents, and correlated outputs

Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 65 (2019) 11, pp. 5360-5370

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012125971

Cooperation versus competition between agents in relational contracts

Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 179 (2023) 3/4, pp. 616-638

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014487127

Relational incentive contracts for teams of multitasking agents

Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014431310

Teams and tournaments in relational contracts

Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond - 2014

We analyze relational contracts for a set of agents when either (a) only aggregate output or (b) individual outputs are observable. A team incentive scheme, where each agent is paid a bonus for aggregate output above a threshold, is optimal in case (a). The team's efficiency may increase...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010349864