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Cooperation in small groups : the effect of group size
Nosenzo, Daniele; Quercia, Simone; Sefton, Martin - 2013 - Revised version of 2012-17, This version: 29 July 2013
We study the effect of group size on cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanism games. As in previous experiments … find that cooperation is highest of all in twoperson groups. The findings in the high MPCR condition are consistent with … those from n-person prisoner's dilemma and oligopoly experiments that suggest it is more difficult to sustain cooperation in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009772221
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Voluntary versus enforced team effort
Keser, Claudia; Montmarquette, Claude - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 277-301
players to choose team remuneration in a series of laboratory experiments. This allows for high cooperation payoffs but also … provides individual free-riding incentives. Due to significant cooperation, we observe that, in team remuneration, participants …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752421
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Social motives in intergroup conflict
Weisel, Ori; Zultan, Ro'i - 2013
We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one’s own influence on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009792169
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Polarization and Group Cooperation
Robbett, Andrea; Matthews, Peter Hans - 2021
affiliations are unknown. We find no differences in cooperation across groups that are able to punish free-riding behavior. Thus …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241812
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Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships : an experiment
Crosetto, Paolo; Gaudeul, Alexia; Riener, Gerhard - 2014
We explore in an experiment what leads to the breakdown of partnerships. Subjects are assigned a partner and participate in a repeated public good game with stochastic outcomes. They can choose each period between staying in the public project or working on their own. There is excessive exit as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340746
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Procrastination and projects
Külpmann, Philipp - 2015
In this paper I analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players are working together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The effort needed to achieve such a breakthrough is unknown but players have a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304680
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Teams contribute more and punish less
Auerswald, Heike; Schmidt, Carsten; Thum, Marcel; … - 2016
Challenges in global politics like climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are mostly made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011541282
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Teams contribute more and punish less : conference paper
Auerswald, Heike; Schmidt, Carsten; Thum, Marcel; … - 2014 - This version: 24 March 2014
Many decisions in politics and business are made by teams rather than by single individuals. In contrast, economic models typically assume an individual rational decision maker. A rapidly growing body of (experimental) literature investigates team decisions in different settings. We study team...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010488535
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Relative Rewards within Team-Based Compensation
Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2006
bonus is substantial. In this case, however, the data suggests that tournament competition crowds out voluntary cooperation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779052
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Limiting the Leader : Fairness Concerns in Team Production with Leader-Determined Monitoring
Boosey, Luke; Isaac, R. Mark; Ramalingam, Abhijit - 2021
We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the extent to which leaders---faced with opportunistic incentives---employ monitoring to improve team production. Participants are assigned to teams, with one person appointed as the leader. The leader has the power to commit to a monitoring option,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217455