This paper reconsiders the explanation of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to license their innovations and to pool their R&D investments. We show that in equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic...

We reconsider the justifications of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to pool R&D investments and license innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits of R&D investment in the...

We implement an experimental design based on a duopoly game in which subjects choose whether to cooperate in Research and Development (R&D) activities. We first conduct six experimental markets that differ in both the levels of knowledge spillovers and the intensity of competition. Consistently...

We implement an experimental design based on a duopoly game in which subjects choose whether to cooperate in Research and Development (R&D) activities. We first conduct six experimental markets that differ in both the levels of knowledge spillovers and the intensity of competition. Consistently...