This paper identifies view points of the Palestinian telecommunications sector's stakeholders with regard to regulatory independence and analyzes reasons behind the rejection of the 2009 Telecommunications Law that establishes an independent telecommunications regulatory authority. It sheds a...

This paper investigates Palestine's institutional foundations in order to decide on the most appropriate telecommunications regulatory system. It is based on the work of Levy and Spiller's institutional endowment framework. Comments and adjustments to the framework are also discussed and...

This paper discusses regulatory design in unstable states. It focuses on the regulatory attributes of the regulatory authority. The paper analyzes three unstable states (Kosovo, Lebanon and Palestine) and offers a set of policy recommendations for additional and essential safeguards that shall...

This paper identifies view points of the Palestinian telecommunications sector's stakeholders with regard to regulatory independence and analyzes reasons behind the rejection of the 2009 Telecommunications Law that establishes an independent telecommunications regulatory authority. It sheds a...

Technological progress allows Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to carry out network manage-ment practices in a discriminatory fashion without being detected by their customers. This creates an opportunity that providers will exploit this information asymmetry in an opportunistic way by blocking...

In the current telecommunications domain, a clear trend towards vertical disintegration is observed, whereas multiple actors take up different roles in the value chain instead of one monopoly operator that is responsible for the full service delivery. Although this trend is observed in different...

Traditionally, neoclassical economics has been the guiding framework in the development of legislative and regulatory rules in the telecommunication markets. The regulatory perspective has long assumed a static environment. However, telecommunication markets have evolved into extremely dynamic,...

We study the implementation of reasonably efficient operator margin squeeze tests by National Regulatory Authorities in European telecommunications markets. We provide a theoretical framework in which we show how regulatory authorities deal with the asymmetries between the entrants and the...

In this paper, we study the adjustments made by National Regulatory Authorities to simple margin squeeze tests, in order to model a reasonably efficient operator. More precisely, by inspecting the possible differences between an entrant and an incumbent that would cause a market disadvantage for...