We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales price to which followers adjust according to their individual supply functions. The price leader clears the market by serving the...

Based on the acquiring-a-company game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...

Relying on the specific example of ultimatum bargaining experiments this paper explores the possible role of empirical knowledge of behavioural norm(ative) facts" within the search for an inter-personal (W)RE - (Wide) Reflective Equilibrium on normative issues. Assuming that pro-social behaviour...

Die Arbeit basiert auf fünf Aufsätzen. In diesen wird über vier Experimentserien berichtet, die das individuelle Entscheidungsverhalten von Versuchspersonen in ähnlichen, aber verschieden komplexen Situationen erheben. Es wird ein experimentelles Szenario vorgestellt, mit dessen Hilfe...

Previous studies have shown that decision makers are less other-regarding when their own payoff is risky than when it is sure. Empirical observations also indicate that people care more about identifiable than unidentiiable others. In this paper, we report on an experiment designed to explore...

Contrary to the models of deterministic life cycle saving, we take it for granted that uncertainty of one's future is the essential problem of saving decisions. However, unlike the stochastic life cycle models, we capture this crucial uncertainty by a non-Bayesian scenario-based satisficing...

We report on an experiment designed to explore whether allowing individuals to voice their anger prevents costly punishment. For this sake, we use an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two treatments: one in which responders can only accept or reject the o®er, and the other in which they can...

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includes it as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic...

Human decision making is a process guided by different and partly competing mo-tivations that can each dominate behavior and lead to different effects depending on strength and circumstances. Over-stylizing" neglects such competing concerns and context-dependence, although it facilitates the...

In generosity games, one agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas the other is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. This has been shown to induce pie choices which are either efficiency or equality seeking. In our experiment, before playing the generosity game,...