Multidimensional heterogeneity and endogeneity are important features of a wide class of econometric models. With control variables to correct for endogeneity, nonparametric identification of treatment effects requires strong support conditions. To alleviate this requirement, we consider varying...

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size $y$. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters $\lambda$ that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an...

Empirical tests of the Nash bargaining solution (NBS, hereafter) are developed under different hypotheses about the behavior of disagreement utility levels.

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters ? that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is...

The empirical analysis of discrete complete-information games has relied on behavioral restrictions in the form of solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium. Choosing the right solution concept is crucial not just for identification of payoff parameters, but also for the validity and...

Multidimensional heterogeneity and endogeneity are important features of a wide class of econometric models. With control variables to correct for endogeneity, nonparametric identification of treatment effects requires strong support conditions. To alleviate this requirement, we consider varying...