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Job search, unemployment protection and informal work in advanced economies
Long, Iain W.; Polito, Vito - 2017
This paper investigates the incentives that may induce workers to supplement income from unemployment benefits by engaging in temporary informal work. Using a dynamic model of job-search with moral hazard that incorporates a stylised schedule of benefit payments, we describe how informal sector...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011761509
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Welfare effects of unemployment benefits when informality is high
Liepmann, Hannah; Pignatti, Clemente - 2021
We analyze for the first time the welfare effects of unemployment benefits (UBs) in a context of high informality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012596314
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Unemployment dynamics with informality : an empirical analysis for a developing country
Corseuil, Carlos Henrique; Foguel, Miguel Nathan; … - 2023
decomposition unveils that the contribution of the flow from informality to unemployment is larger than that of the flow from formal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014331921
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Cross-subsidies, and the elasticity of informality to social expenditures
Alonso Ortiz, Jorge; Leal, Julio - 2014
frictions model with informality, (ex post) heterogeneous workers, and conditional taxes and transfers. In the model, formal … informality is quite inelastic due to frictions, and due to the opposing forces of taxes and transfers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010459828
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Are informal self-employment and informal employment as employee behaviorally distinct labor force states?
Flabbi, Luca; Tejada, Mauricio - 2023
literature using search models to study labor market informality: should informal self-employment and informal employment as … equality between the two states, cautioning against aggregating them in a common "informality state." The parametric model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014290360
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Informality, labor regulation, and the business cycle
Leyva, Gustavo; Urrutia, Carlos - 2018
We analyze the joint impact of employment protection and informality on macroeconomic volatility and the propagation of … particular to business cycle moments for employment and informality obtained from our own calculations with the ENOE survey for … formal sector, are key to obtain a counter-cyclical informality rate. In our model both the economy without an informal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012165940
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A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance
Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente; … - 2002
This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model that can explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility, unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote over unemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary e.ects of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539071
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Should UI benefits really fall over time?
Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente - 2002
The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414504
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414725
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245