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Industrial organization

Rose, Nancy L. - In: NBER reporter online (2006/2007) 2, pp. 1-7

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011366969

Industrial organization

Rose, Nancy L. - In: NBER reporter online (2012) 4, pp. 1-6

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011367776

Firm diversification and CEO compensation : managerial ability or executive entrenchment?

Rose, Nancy L.; Shepard, Andrea - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000888213

The diffusion of new technologies : evidence from the electric utility industry

Rose, Nancy L. - In: The Rand journal of economics 21 (1990) 3, pp. 354-373

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001099980

The effects of economic regulation

Joskow, Paul L.; Rose, Nancy L. - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001489052

Political constraints on executive compensation : evidence from the electric utility industry

Joskow, Paul L. - In: The Rand journal of economics 27 (1996) 1, pp. 165-182

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001197887

Ceo pay and firm performance : dynamics, asymmetries, and alternative performance measures

Joskow, Paul L. - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000924726

Firm diversification and CEO compensation : managerial ability or executive entrenchment?

Rose, Nancy L. - In: The Rand journal of economics 28 (1997) 3, pp. 489-514

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001226240

Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation : Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment?

Rose, Nancy L. - 2000

Data for a sample of 558 CEOs over 1985-1990 suggest substantial compensation premia for managers of diversified firms. The CEO of a firm with two distinct lines of business averages 10 to 12 percent more in salary and bonus and 13 to 17 percent more in total compensation than the CEO of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012788556

Five Principles for Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy

Baker, Jonathan B. - 2020

There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice's 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not reflect either modern theoretical and empirical economic analysis or current agency enforcement policy. Yet widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies have been expressed among...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849889