Similar Search Results

Equity risk, conversion risk, and the demand for insurance

Garratt, Rod; Marshall, John M. - In: The journal of risk and insurance : the journal of the … 70 (2003) 3, pp. 439-460

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001787159

Exclusions and the demand for property insurance

Garratt, Rod; Marshall, John M. - In: The Geneva papers on risk and insurance theory 25 (2000) 2, pp. 131-139

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001568744

An application of Shapley value cost allocation to liquidity savings mechanisms

Garratt, Rod - In: Journal of money, credit and banking : JMCB 54 (2022) 6, pp. 1875-1888

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013466505

A tale of two cities and a Giffen good

Garratt, Rod - In: The Canadian journal of economics 38 (2005) 1, pp. 49-56

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002655112

A free entry and exit experience

Garratt, Rod - In: The journal of economic education 31 (2000) 3, pp. 237-243

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001497392

Decentralizing lottery allocations in markets with indivisible commodities

Garratt, Rod - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 5 (1995), pp. 295-313

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001177877

Indivisibilities, inferior goods, and Giffen goods

Garratt, Rod - In: The Canadian journal of economics 30 (1997) 1, pp. 246-251

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001222848

The connectedness of the set of equilibrium money prices depends on the choice of the numeraire

Garratt, Rod - In: Journal of economic theory 56 (1992) 1, pp. 206-217

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001121984

Speculation in standard auctions with resale

Garratt, Rod; Tröger, Thomas - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 74 (2006) 3, pp. 753-769

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003329587

Collusion via resale

Garratt, Rod - 2008

The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850403