This paper investigates the strategic value of the managerial incentive scheme in affecting firms' incentive in R&D investment and their product market activities. Firstly, we find that in Cournot-quantity competition, owners strategically assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their...

Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are frequently used to measure the effects of managerial incentives on corporate innovation. However, these estimates suffer from two data problems. First, corporate innovation data have a discrete spike at zero because many firms never engage in corporate...

This paper investigates the strategic value of the managerial incentive scheme in affecting firms' incentive in R&D investment and their product market activities. Firstly, we find that in Cournot-quantity competition, owners strategically assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their...

This paper provides highly significant evidence that golden parachutes spur innovation in concentrated-ownership corporations and State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs). Taking advantage of China's institutional features, we find that golden parachutes lead to higher levels of innovation quantity and...

An agency model is proposed that identifies the optimal executive compensation scheme for a business where the owner's delegation of investment decision-making to the manager gives rise to a two-dimensional moral hazard problem relating to the levels of managerial effort and innovation,...