This paper presents a systematic empirical relationship between money and subsequent prices and output, using US, euro area and Swiss data since the 1960-70s. Monetary developments, unlike interest rate stance measures, are shown to provide qualitative and quantitative information on subsequent...

This paper proposes an equilibrium relationship between expected exchange rate changes and differentials in expected returns on risky assets. We show that when expected returns on a risky asset in a certain economy are higher than the returns that are expected from investing in a risky asset in...

We study the tension between fiscal decentralization and progressive taxation. We present a multi-community model in which households differ in incomes and housing preferences and in which the local income tax rate is a function of an exogenous progressive tax schedule and an endogenous local...

This paper proposes sequential matching and inverse selection probability weighting to estimate dynamic causal effects. The sequential matching estimators extend simple, matching estimators based on propensity scores for static causal analysis that have been frequently applied in the evaluation...

Income support for working low income families (the ?working poor?) is on top of the political agenda in Switzerland. The current social assistance system is considered inadequate to support working poor households. Labour unions propose the introduction of a general minimum wage, whereas the...

Why do political constituencies delegate decision power to representative assemblies? And how is the size of such assemblies determined? We analyze these questions of constitutional design in a model with voters learning their preferred alternative only after engaging in costly information...

We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur in jurisdictions with referendum decisions on policy centralization. Citizens choose centralization of public spending and revenue in order to internalize spillovers if individual...

We report the results of a field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the...

Implementing performance pay requires that workers' output be measured. When measurement costs differ among firms, those with a measurement cost advantage choose to implement performance pay. They attract the best workers, and both the level and variability of compensation are higher at these...