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When do central banks prefer to intervene secretly?

Ferré, Montserrat; Manzano Tovar, Carolina - In: International journal of finance & economics : IJFE 14 (2009) 4, pp. 378-393

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003902068

Central bank accountability and transparency : theory and some evidence

Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W.; Hoeberichts, Marco - 2000

accountability of the ECB with some other central banks (Bank of Canada, Bank of Japan, Bank of England and the Federal Reserve … Japan, Bank of England und Federal Reserve System). Im zweiten Teil stellen wir eine Theorie über die Rechenschaftspflicht … Geldpolitik und die Frage, wer die endgültige Verantwortung für die Geldpolitik trägt. Das Papier zeigt auf, dass die …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418852

The Central-bank balance sheet as an instrument of monetary policy

Cúrdia, Vasco; Woodford, Michael - 2010

"While many analyses of monetary policy consider only a target for a short-term nominal interest rate, other dimensions of policy have recently been of greater importance: changes in the supply of bank reserves, changes in the assets acquired by central banks, and changes in the interest rate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994893

The central-bank balance sheet as an instrument of monetary policy

Cúrdia, Vasco; Woodford, Michael - 2010

While many analyses of monetary policy consider only a target for a short-term nominal interest rate, other dimensions of policy have recently been of greater importance: changes in the supply of bank reserves, changes in the assets acquired by central banks, and changes in the interest rate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657197