Corrupt arrangements are characterized by a high risk of opportunism. Moreover, denunciation and extortion add another layer of uncertainty for participants in corrupt transactions. This paper demonstrates how legislators can use an asymmetric design of criminal sanctions to amplify these...

We use a stylized model to show that, if transfers to the poor are founded on a security argument, there is a negative trade-o¤ between law enforcement expenditures and criminality. In contrast, if transfers are based on altruism, the correlation between the same variables may appear positive....

Ausgangspunkt der modelltheoretischen Betrachtungen war in Abschnitt 2.1 die Feststellung, dass die herkömmliche Strafbemessung in weiten Bereichen kühl kalkulierende Steuerhinterzieher von ihrem Tun nicht abbringen wird. Die herkömmliche Strafbemessung folgt dem Gedanken der Bestrafung nach...