sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … estimate multi-spell duration models with selection on unobserved characteristics. We find that a vacancy referral increases …

sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … estimate multi-spell duration models with selection on unobserved characteristics. We find that a vacancy referral increases …

sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … estimate multi-spell duration models with selection on unobserved characteristics. We find that a vacancy referral increases …

unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We estimate multispell …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante threat of sanctions. Based on a large inflow sample into unemployment …

employers rank applicants by their duration in unemployment, incentivizing all job seekers to exert higher search efforts may …We empirically investigate how two-tier unemployment compensation schemes affect the profile of re-employment hazards …. We exploit the aggravation of an existing two-tier scheme in Germany in 2005 and estimate its impact on re …