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Dynamic contracts

Fuchs, William - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003384484

Internal capital markets and the market for durable goods : aspects of the strategy of the firm

Achter, Björn - 2002 - Als Ms. gedr.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001643583

Vertragstheorie : Eine Einführung mit finanzökonomischen Beispielen und Anwendungen ; mit 9 Tabellen

Bannier, Christina E. - 2005

möchten. TOC:Überblick über die Vertragstheorie.- Spieltheorie.- Moral Hazard.- Signalling und Screening.- Adverse Selection …Das Buch gibt einen umfassenden Einblick in die Vertragstheorie vor dem Hintergrund finanzwirtschaftlicher … sowie aktueller Forschungsfragen zur Theorie der Firma und der Auktionsökonomie erfolgt dabei durch Anwendung …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013515126

Vertragstheorie : eine Einführung mit finanzökonomischen Beispielen und Anwendungen; mit ... 9 Tabellen

Bannier, Christina E. - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014010405

Uncertainty, production, choice, and agency : the state-contingent approach

Chambers, Robert G.; Quiggin, John C. - 2000 - 1. publ.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001423164

Three essays on information and incentives

Bierbaum, Jürgen - 2003 - 1. Aufl.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001749188

Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429934

Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436207

Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436518

Credence goods, costly diagnosis and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 128 (2018) 611, pp. 1367-1394

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011951205

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