In Aristoteles' bestem Staat ist die Wirtschaft an politischen Vorgaben ausgerichtet, die ihrerseits ethisch determiniert sind. Aristoteles bemüht sich um empirische Absicherung, soweit diese mit seinen ethischen Axiomen konform geht. Bei der Zurückweisung der platonischen Weiber- und...

This paper offers an explanation for why policy makers stick to inefficient policy decisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a bad signal to voters about the policy maker's competence if voters do not have complete knowledge about the effects of implemented policies. I derive the optimal...

We present a dynamic model of the interaction between interest groupsand policymakers, featuringendogenous interest group formation. We show that complicated dynamicpatterns in economicpolicies may arise once interest group formation is taken intoaccount.

We suggest a probabilistic voting model where voters' preferences for alternative public goods display habit formation. Current policies determine habit levels and in turn the future preferences of the voters. This allows the incumbent to act strategically in order to influence the probability...

All rulers face political competition, both from rivals within their state, and from other states to which their subjects may exit. In a simple model, both kinds of competition are substitutes. Internal competition (democracy) benefits citizens by allowing them to replace rent-seeking rulers....

This festschrift celebrates the extensive contribution John Wanna has made to the research and practice of politics, policy and public administration. It includes both personal acknowledgements of his work and substantial essays on the issues that he focused most closely upon during his academic...

We present a theory to explain government procrastination as a consequence of its present-bias resulting from the political uncertainty in a two-party political system. We show that under a two-party political system the party in office tends to be present-biased. This may lead to inefficient...