A view advanced in the aftermath of the late-2000s financial crisis is that lower than optimal interest rates lead to excessive risk taking by financial intermediaries. We evaluate this view in a quantitative dynamic model where interest rate policy affects risk taking by changing the amount of...

Academic research generates scholarly publications which practitioners do not read. Practitio-ners face challenges which scholars do not address. They speak different languages and move in different worlds. In a field now known as microfinance, this paper is a personal account of taking turns...

La recherche académique génère des publications spécialisées que les opérateurs de terrain ne lisent pas. Eux-mêmes font face à des défis que les universitaires n'étudient pas. Chercheurs et praticiens parlent des langages différents et vivent dans des mondes distincts. Cet article se...

We study the impact of ambiguity on two alternative institutions of financial intermediation in an economy where consumers face uncertain liquidity needs. The ambiguity the consumers experience is modeled by the degree of confidence in their additive beliefs. We analyze the optimal liquidity...

We study the effects of a bank’s engagement in trading. Traditional banking is relationship-based: not scalable, long-term oriented, with high implicit capital, and low risk (thanks to the law of large numbers). Trading is transactions-based: scalable, short-term, capital constrained, and with...

This paper analyzes credit risk transfer in banking. Specifically, we model loan sales and loan insurance (e.g. credit default swaps) as the two instruments of risk transfer. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the adverse selection problem is as relevant in loan insurance as it is in loan...

We analyze the effect of counterparty risk on insurance contracts using the case of credit risk transfer in banking. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem caused by the insuree's ability to influence the probability of a claim, this paper uncovers a new moral hazard problem on the...