We extend the tax versus permits literature by considering permit supply functions and pollution tax functions that are generalizations of the usual constant permit supply and constant pollution tax rate. In our model, pollution is not uniformly mixed and the regulator is uncertain about the...

We extend the analysis of optimal scale in pollution permit markets by allowing for both market power and private information. We characterize the total costs (abatement costs and damages) under market power and private information and compare them to total costs under competition. It is...

Compliance links between CO2 emission trading programs--where firms regulated under one region's tradable permit program can comply using permits from another region, and vice-versa--are beginning to arise as a vehicle to lower costs, increase liquidity, and strengthen institutions while...

Epidemiologists have documented both acute short-term and chronic long-term damages associated with exposure to air pollution, while atmospheric scientists have demonstrated that air pollution exposure depends on meteorological conditions, which are stochastic. We analyze the implications of...

We analyze a novel method for improving the efficiency of pollution permit markets by optimizing the way in which emissions are exchanged through trade. Under full-information, it is optimal for emissions to exchange according to the ratio of marginal damages. However, under a canonical model...

We analyze the effects of strategic behavior and private information in pollution permit markets in which all firms have market power. The market is characterized by supply-function equilibria. Firms submit net supplies for permits and a market maker selects the market-clearing price. Net...

An interesting feature of pollution permit markets is that citizens may purchase permits to directly lower the levels of pollution. We analyze the effects of citizens' demand for permits on incentive compatible mechanisms for pollution control that are based on permit markets. We show that...

Should citizens lobby the government to reduce pollution permit endowments or should they participate directly in the market by purchasing and retiring permits? We address this question in a two-stage model. In the first stage firms and citizens exert effort to influence the endowment of...