The problem that we address in this paper stems from the trend to delegation in the water management field. It refers to the municipality's negotiating disadvantage in the face of cartelized water management firms that makes delegation, once undertaken, virtually irreversible. We show why the...

This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner?s dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large...

This paper presents the model of an economy subject to the mass conservation principle. The economic system is related to the environment by a flow of virgin materials into the economy, and by the diffusion of waste into the environment. Ecoefficiency contributes to reducing material waste in...

This paper presents the model of an economy subject to the mass conservation principle. The economic system is related to the environment by a flow of virgin materials into the economy, and by the diffusion of waste into the environment. Ecoefficiency contributes to reducing material waste in...

This paper studies the incentives for international cooperation if (some) countries prefer a more equitable distribution of per capita emission levels. The impact of such an equity preference is analyzed first for a bilateral, and then for a multilateral environmental problem. We show that -...

This paper surveys the recent literature devoted to the analysis of the interactions between the adoption of voluntary or negotiated agreements as a tool of environmental policy and market structure. The goal of this survey is twofold. On the one hand, we would like to identify the market...