We investigate the connection between corporate governance system configurations and the role of intermediaries in the respective systems from a informational perspective. Building on the economics of information we show that it is meaningful to distinguish between internalisation and...

Minority shareholdings have been on the regulatory agenda of competition authorities for some time. Recent empirical studies, however, draw attention to a new, thought provoking theory of harm: common ownership by institutional investors holding small, parallel equity positions in several...

Agents are either guided directly by the elicited or communicated preferences of their principals, including both the conditions or states that their principals value and the particular actions the principals prefer that agents use to realize those states (goal priority), or can research clues...

The problem of managerial agency costs dominates debates in corporate law. Many leading scholars advocate reforms that would reduce agency costs by forcing firms to allocate more control to shareholders. Such proposals disregard the costs that shareholders avoid by delegating control to managers...

This article analyzes the manifold situations in which the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) has influenced — or has failed to influence — federal securities regulation and state corporate law, and the prospective roles for the EMH in these contexts. In federal securities regulation, the EMH...

While several studies have demonstrated that there is a relative price difference between companies listed on the stock market and privately held enterprises, no academic study has addressed the question of how this private enterprise discount can be reduced and the proceeds from a divestment...

Does corporate governance structure matter for firm value? We develop a model in which the allocation of control rights between shareholders and managers (“governance structure”) affects managers' incentive to invest (strong governance tightens managerial freedom and weak governance loosens...

This paper analyzes optimal incentive contracts for information acquisition and revelation. A decision maker faces the problem to design a contract that provides an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in general not optimal to reward the expert if his...

This paper analyzes the effects of the way information is produced and transmitted through an organizational structure on the business dynamics of a firm. Specifically, I study its effects on the agency problem, concluding that it proves to be an efficient and effective solution to overcome the...

This was the first article explicitly on the theory of agency published in a regular, i.e., nonproceedings, issue of a journal in social science.The paper presents a fiduciary function model of policing in agency, with an application to attempts to influence regulatory performance by policing...