This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with … monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about … to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In …

Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of … mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which … in which the effectiveness of mutual monitoring depends not on these factors, but rather on strong reciprocity: the …

An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither … the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient … condition for the implementability of monitoring policies. Typically, several monitoring intensities give rise to the same …