evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in … are here outlined, and connections with learning models and standard notions of game-theoretic rationality and equilibrium …

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …

equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a … fourth strategy, Dumb. Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but the TASP places no weight on Dumb …

Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a …