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Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Games and economic behavior 82 (2013), pp. 1-14
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010239068
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On stable and strategy-rooproof rules in matching markets with contracts
Hirata, Daisuke; Kasuya, Yusuke - 2015 - This version: September 25, 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549863
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Incentives, fairness, and efficiency in group identification
Cho, Wonki Jo; Saporiti, Alejandro - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010493882
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Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies
Momi, Takeshi - In: Social choice and welfare 55 (2020) 2, pp. 325-367
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012263385
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On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
Hirata, Daisuke; Kasuya, Yusuke - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590652
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Supplementary note to "On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts"
Hirata, Daisuke; Kasuya, Yusuke - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590660
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School choice with vouchers
Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz - In: Journal of economic theory 179 (2019), pp. 57-72
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131458
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On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
Hirata, Daisuke; Kasuya, Yusuke - In: Journal of economic theory 168 (2017), pp. 27-43
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011747405
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Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
Momi, Takeshi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1267-1306
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753058
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Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
Momi, Takeshi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1267-1306
In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744271