voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee impatience). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic …

We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members who possess private information … information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000) shows that members reveal their information in a straw poll only if their … preferences are in fact homogeneous. By taking costs of time into account, we demonstrate that committees have strictly higher …

This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the … sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex post … conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and …

during an election day. Using a pivotal costly voting model of elections in which voters have privately observed preferences …

This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule …. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in the spirit of Condorcet, a symmetric composition of committees is not always … committees. However, in the special case of only two skill levels, it is optimal to compose the committees evenly. …

information aggregation. Despite this, unanimity is frequently used in committees making decisions on behalf of society. This … rationale for the widespread use of unanimous voting. …

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who … characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how … correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then …

committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters …Some committees convene behind closed doors while others publicly discuss issues and make their decisions. This paper … increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This …

members can improve the voting outcome by simplifying the strategies of unbiased members. Thus, heterogeneous committees … perform at least as well as homogeneous committees. In particular, when value-maximizers outnumber biased members by one vote …