This paper analyzes wage competition between national trade unions caused by the international mobility of capital. Perfect capital mobility leads to a Bertrand result for the outcome of wage competition: A pure strategy equilibrium implies full employment in all countries. It is shown that such...

We examine how openness interacts with the coordination of consumption-leisure decisions in determining the equilibrium working hours and wage rate when there are leisure externalities (e.g., due to social interactions). The latter are modelled by allowing a worker’s marginal utility of...

The labor wage is the result of market variables and institutional settings of a country. In an open economy the determination of the market wage rate may be further affected by the extent of international mobility of both factors of production, labor and capital. Labor mobility is represented...

We construct a partial equilibrium model of intra-industry cross-hauling DFI with unionized duopoly, where wages and employment are determined through Nash bargaining between firms and national labor unions. We show that under symmetry, cross-hauling DFI is the unique Nash equilibrium, in which...

Imposing a minimum quality standard (MQS) is conventionally regarded as harmful if firms compete in quantities. This, however, ignores its possible dynamic effects. We show that an MQS can hinder collusion, resulting in dynamic welfare gains that reduce and may outweigh the static losses which...

We develop a model with endogeneity in key features of industrial structure linked to heterogeneous cost structures under Cournot competition. We use the model to explore issues related to cross-country differences in industry structure and the impact of globalization on markups and pricing,...

We analyze vertical structures where a regulated network operator serves n network users, and the network users compete in quantities for customers. We distinguish two cases: (i) none of the network users are related to the network operator (ownership unbundling), (ii) one of the network users...

We analyze the effect of price caps on equilibrium production and welfare in oligopoly under demand uncertainty. We find that high price caps always increase production and welfare as compared to the situation without price cap. Price caps close to marginal cost may lead to zero production,...

We analyze a market game where firms choose capacities under uncertainty about future market conditions and make output choices after uncertainty has unraveled. We show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under imperfect competition and establish that capacity choices by strategic firms are...

We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D. Under Cournot competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand competition. More importantly, Cournot competition yields lower prices than...