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Exposure problem in multi-unit auctions
Gunay, Hikmet; Meng, Xin - 2012
-unit simultaneous ascending auction. The global bidder wants to win both licenses to enjoy synergies; therefore, she bids more than her … the frequency of inefficient allocation in the simultaneous ascending auction. Then, we show that the Vickrey …-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism may generate more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332442
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Signaling in Auctions among Competitors
von Scarpatetti, Benedikt; Wasser, Cédric - 2010
of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms … bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334084
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Innovation Contests with Entry Auction
Giebe, Thomas - 2010
effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts … and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334102
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Ordinal cheap talk in common value auctions
Chakraborty, Archishman (contributor);  … - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or partial ordering of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001769030
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Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2001
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire covert information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists which provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165690
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Signaling in auctions among competitors
Scarpatetti, Benedikt von; Wasser, Cédric - 2010
of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms … bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935653
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Innovation contests with entry auction
Giebe, Thomas - 2010
effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts … and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935696
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Appraising the 'Merger Price' Appraisal Rule
Choi, Albert H. - 2018
This paper develops an auction design framework to analyze various methods for assessing “fair value” in post …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935039
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Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement : A Simple Model of Handicapping
Cesi, Berardino - 2008
When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012725083
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Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2001
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists which provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014130155