Showing 1 - 10 of 5,623
-unit simultaneous ascending auction. The global bidder wants to win both licenses to enjoy synergies; therefore, she bids more than her … the frequency of inefficient allocation in the simultaneous ascending auction. Then, we show that the Vickrey …-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism may generate more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332442
of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms … bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334084
effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts … and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334102
of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms … bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935653
effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts … and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935696
Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or partial ordering of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001769030
This paper develops an auction design framework to analyze various methods for assessing “fair value” in post …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935039
each round of the auction are implicitly defined (pointwise) by a system of nonlinear equations so that conditions for the … develop an econometric model thus extending the literature on structural estimation of auction models Finally an empirical … example illustrates how equilibrium learning affects bidding during the course of the auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293455
This paper studies revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is inter-bidders resale, where the winner in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325055
-player strategic game, modeled as an all-pay auction, each athlete has private information about his actual physical ability and choses …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390690