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I develop a model of public sector contracting based on the multitask framework by Holmström and Milgrom (1991). In this model, an agent can put effort into increasing the quality of a service or reducing costs. Being residual claimants, private owners have stronger incentives to cut costs than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320112
I develop a model of public sector contracting based on the multitask framework by Holmström and Milgrom (1991). In this model, an agent can put effort into increasing the quality of a service or reducing costs. Being residual claimants, private owners have stronger incentives to cut costs than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281289
We revisit the contract-theoretic literature on privatization initiated by Hart et al. (1997). This literature has two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014348766
The government wants a certain good or service to be provided. Should the required assets be publicly or privately owned or should a partnership be formed‘ Building on the incomplete contracting approach, we argue that the initially specified quantity of an ex ante describable basic good can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014210209
We show that privatization can be beneficial even if the government is rational and benevolent, and if the firm …, privatization is strictly preferable if the firm's future survival does not crucially depend on the success of managerial effort. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335738
We show that privatization can be beneficial even if the government is rational and benevolent, and if the firm …, privatization is strictly preferable if the firm's future survival does not crucially depend on the success of managerial effort. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597691
We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752337
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398756
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399065
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off- equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402672